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Revitalizing The Maryland
Wage Compensation Law
by Gerard M. Waites

Introduction
The Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94
(1985), provides persons employed within
the state of Maryland certain rights and
remedies with respect to the payment and
collection of wages, fringe benefits and
other types of employee compensation.
The principal purpose of the statute is to
provide assistance to employees seeking to
recover compensation unlawfully withheld. The statute also attempts to ensure
the prompt payment of wages by establishing regular pay periods and imposing time
limitations for payments due. Moreover,
the broader policy goal served by these
functions is the maintenance of economic
stability and industrial peace.
The wage payment and collection law is
important because a person who renders
services in exchange for a promise of wages
or other compensation is entitled to be
assured that such payment will be made.
Otherwise, significant social and economic
problems would result from inadequate
protection of such a basic right. In order
for this right to be sufficiently protected, it
is necessary that effective legal mechanisms
exist which guarantee the prompt and
timely payment of wages, or in the alternative, provide efficient and reliable means
for the collection of wages unlawfully
withheld.
For these reasons, most states have
enacted wage payment and collection laws
designed to address these problems and
needs. Such laws provide various legal
remedies, including liquidated or treble
damages, criminal penalties and attorney's
fees, which ensure the protection of

employee rights and deter employer misconduct. Additionally, the statutory
schemes created by these laws often provide for both private and governmental
enforcement.
The objective of this article is to provide
a critical, yet constructive, analysis and
evaluation of the Maryland Wage Payment
and Collection Law, with an eye toward
amending the law to make it more effective in accomplishing its intended purpose.
In pursuit of this objective, the Maryland
law will be compared and contrasted to
similar wage collection statutes enacted by
other states. The effectiveness of a wage
collection law can best be evaluated by a
review of the judicial decisions arising
under the statute which interpret the law
and seek to carry out its intent. Accordingly, the case law which has arisen under
these statutes will be reviewed in order to
examine how such laws operate in practice. Upon such a review, it will become
clear that the success of any wage collection law depends, to a significant extent,
upon the particular mix of rights, remedies
and enforcement mechanisms provided for
in the statutory scheme selected.
When the Maryland statute is compared
with other wage collection laws, it
becomes clear that the Maryland law contains a number of critical shortcomings
and deficiencies which seriously limit and
impair its effectiveness. In order to rectify
what appear to be the most significant of
these problems, it is submitted that three
specific admendments to the Maryland
statute should be adopted:
(1) the statute should expressly provide
employees with a private right'of action to

enforce the provisions of the statute;
(2) the statute should permit any
employee who prevails in a private action
the right to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and costs; and
(3) the statute should provide that where
the employer is a corporation, corporate
officers should be subject to personal liability for violations of the law committed
in the corporate name.
It is further submitted that enactment of
these amendments will help ensure that
the underlying goals and policies of the
statute are better served. Without such
revisions, the rights of employees, as set
forth in the statute, are not likely to be
forcefully and adequately protected.
Without effective enforcement, the rights
and guarantees the statute purports to hold
out become no more than empty "paper"
promises.
Analysis
A. The Mechanics of the Maryland Act
The Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94
(1985), defines the rights of employees and
the duties and responsibilities of employers with respect to the payment and collection of wages. Subsection (a)(3) of the
statute defines wages as "any remuneration, compensation, bonus, commission,
and! or fringe benefit promised in return
for services by an employee." The statute
further provides that such "wages" shall
be paid by the employer, with some exceptions, "at least once every two weeks" and
imposes certain time limits as to when payment must be made "upon [an employee's]
termination of employment." §94(b) and
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(e)} Additionally, the law obligates the
employer to meet certain notice requirements with respect to changes in rates of
pay and it restricts the employer's ability
to effect deductions from an employee's
wages. §94{c) and (d).
In the event an employer fails to comply
with these provisions, an injured employee
may seek redress by filing a complaint
with the Commissioner of Labor and
Industry. If it is determined that the complaint has merit, the commissioner may
attempt to resolve it through informal
means, such as mediation, or may request
civil prosecution from the Attorney General. §94{g){1) and (2). Where a civil action
is brought on behalf of an employee, the
statute provides that the court may "award
an employee up to [three] times the
amount of wages unlawfully withheld."
§94(g){2).2 Additionally, §94{f){1) of the
statute provides that criminal penalties
may be imposed against an employer who
"willfully violates the provisions" of the
statute.3 Thus, on its face, the statute
appears to provide the type of enforcement mechanisms and sanctions necessary
to compel compliance. It is questionable,
however, whether in reality the Act has
been successful in accomplishing its goal.
Since the original passage of the Wage Payment and Collection Law in 1966, there
has not been a civil or criminal lawsuit
brought under it. It is possible that the
reason this law has never been utilized is
due to some super-effective deterrent capability. It is also possible that all Maryland
employers are simply law-abiding citizens
who always pay all their employees on
time and in full. In reality, however, it is
highly unlikely that either of these
explanations is true.
While the argument that the law may
have a significant deterrent effect is not
without merit, it is still not plausible that
this possibility alone explains why, for
over twenty years, the statute has been a
stranger to the judicial arena. Regardless of
the severity of the sanctions, there will
always be those who risk penalty for profit. Moreover, assuming arguendo, that the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry has
been highly successful in settling wage disputes through informal processes, it is
extremely unlikely that every valid wage
claim has been disposed of in this manner.
More realistically, it appears that
Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection
Law has simply been ineffective in assisting injured workers to recover compensation unlawfully withheld! Thus, in light
of the above facts, it· would not be
unfounded or illogical to conclude that a
subtantial number of injuries of the type
intended to be prevented by the Act are

not being redressed. s
B. The Maryland Act in Perspective
The persuasiveness of the above argument is further strengthened when the
Maryland statute is compared with the
wage collection statutes of other states. A
vast majority of the states in this country
have some type of wage payment and collection law. Moreover, many of these statutes provide for civil and criminal
penalties which are as severe, if not more
so, than those afforded by the Maryland
statute. Additionally, most statutory
schemes created by such laws provide for

"Since the ... passage
of the Wage Payment
and Collection
Law. .. there has not
been not a single
l awsuzt. . ... "
state enforcement, as well as various alternatives for the informal resolution of wage
claims. Notwithstanding such similarities,
however, a significant amount of case law
exists under virtually every other state statute. 6
With these factors in mind, why has the
Maryland law never been litigated? The
argument set forth above suggests that the
very non-existence of case law under the
Maryland statute provides sufficient
grounds to question the law's effectiveness.
The non-existence of litigation involving
the Maryland statute becomes even more
troublesome, however, in light of the fact
that other state laws, which afford similar
remedies and penalties, have given rise to
a significant amount of litigation.
If the non-use of the Maryland law is due
to some deterrent effect, why have other
state statutes (some of which provide for
even more severe sanctions) not produced
such results? If the non-use of the
Maryland law is due to an unusually high
degree of succcess achieved by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, why
have other state enforcement agencies not
been so effective?
The answer to these questions is not that
the Maryland statute possesses some unique formula or magic not contained in
other state statutes. Rather, the reason the
Maryland law has been such a stranger to
the courts is due to the manner in which
it is dissimilar to the statutory schemes ere-

ated by other wage collection laws. The
Maryland law does not contain a number
of key provisions included in most other
state wage laws, provisions which make
legal action both a more realistic alternative and a more effective weapon.
The key ingredients missing in the
enforcement scheme created by the
Maryland law are: (1) the right of an
employee to bring a private cause of
action; (2) the right of an employee to
recover attorney's fees in such an action;
and (3) the right to obtain recovery against
corporate officers for willful violations of
the law. Most other state wage collection
laws include such provisions. Morerover,
these rights and remedies are usually made
available in addition to other enforcement
provisions, such as those provided in the
Maryland statute, i.e. treble or liquidated
damages, criminal penalties, informal dispute resolution and state enforcement.
C. The Maryland Statute v. Wage Collection Laws of Other States
While similar to the Maryland law in
many respects, the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law, Pa. Stat.
Ann., tit. 43, §260.1-11a (Purden 1964 &
Supp. 1988), also includes provisions
which allow for both a private right of
action and the recovery of attorney's fees.
Section 26O.9a(a) of the Act provides that
"[a]ny employee or group of employees,
labor organization or party to whom any
type of wages is payable may institute
actions under this act." Furthermore,
§260.9a(f) mandates that in such private
civil actions, "the court. .. shall in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable
attorney's fees of any nature to be paid by
the defendant."
Although the Pennsylvania law does not
expressly state that corporate officers are
liable for violations committed in the
name of the corporation, the law has been
interpreted to allow for such personal liability. The basis relied upon by the courts
for imposing liability upon corporate officers has been the statute's definition of
"employer", which, for purposes of the
act, "[i]ncludes every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, or ...
any agent or officer of any of the above
mentioned classes employing any person
in the [state]." §260.2a. See Amalgamated
Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. Fund 'tI.
Dion, 341 Pa. Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123
(1985).7
It is significant that the Pennsylvania statute provides for these rights and remedies
in addition to: (1) state enforcement (including informal dispute resolution),
(§255.2), liquidated damages (§260.10) and
criminal penalites (§260.11a). It is thus
apparent that the Pennsylvania legislature
believes that a more comprehensive statutory scheme is necessary to ensure the full
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and adequate protection of employee
rights. Pennsylvania is not the only state
which has taken a more comprehensive
approach to the vigorous enforcement of
wage payment and collection laws.
Indeed, by way of example, it is interesting to note that the District of Columbia's
Payment and Collection of Wages Act,
D.C. Code Ann., §§36-101-110 (1988),
closely parallels the statutory scheme created by the Pennsylvania law. Thus, in
addition to providing for liquidated
damages, criminal penalties and governmental enforcement, the District of
Columbia act gives emplyees the right to
bring private civil actions under the statute
(D.C. Code Ann. §38-108 (a», and allows
for attorney's fees in such actions (D.C.
Code Ann. §38-108(b». It also defines
"employer" to include both corporations
and individuals (D.C. Code Ann. §36101(1» (emphasis added).
In addition to the wage payment and collection laws for Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia, numerous other state
wage statutes contain provisions which
allow for private civil actions, attorney's
fees and personal liability of corporate officers. See e.g., N.Y. Lab. Law, §§190-199
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); Cal. Lab.
Code, §§203-270 (West 1971 & Supp.
1988); Iowa Code Ann. §91a. 1-13 (1984 &
Supp. 1988); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.,
§275.42-56 (1986); and Haw. Rev. Stat.,
§388-1-13 (1985).
Upon reviewing these and other similar
wage collection statutes and the body of
case law which has emerged from such statutes, it becomes evident that certain provisions such as a private cause of action,
the right to attorney's fees, and personal
liability of corporate officers are key ingredients to a successful wage collection
scheme. It is significant that a large percentage of the cases arising under such statutes
have been brought by private parties,
rather than by state agencies. Moreover,
plaintiffs in such cases have been highly
successful in recovering not only compensation unlawfully withheld, but also attorney's fees and liquidated damages as well.
Additionally, in a substantial number of
cases, employees have succeeded in utilizing these laws to impose personal liability
upon corporate officers who might have
otherwise escaped liability if the plaintiff/employee had been strictly confined
to common law remedies. 8
In view of these facts, it seems clear that
the right to bring a private civil action,
recover attorney's fees and obtain personal
liability against corporate officers are all
essential ingredients for an efficient and
effective wage collection law. The sections
which follow examine each of these principles in light of statutory provisions which
embody them and judicial decisions which
interpret their meaning and give them

effect.
D. The Case for Allowing a Private
Cause of Action
1. Basic Facts and Principles
The argument set forth above contends
that the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Statute would be more effective if
it was amended to provide for a private
cause of action. 9 The arguments in support
of such an amendment are based upon
sound logic and plain common sense. Moreover, because this type of provision is a
common feature and central ingredient in
the wage collection schemes for a significant number of other states, it is clear that
the practical wisdom of this approach is
well recognized.

"Allowing private
enforcement . ..
guarantees that the
state will accomplish
more for less."
Allowing for private enforcement of
wage collection laws virtually guarantees
that the state will accomplish more for
less. Less state resources would be needed
because private actions would supplement
state enforcement efforts. Additionally,
more widespread and comprehensive
enforcement would be assured because any
employee could invoke the protection of
the law, without depending upon the
approval and support of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
Even assuming that the Division of
Labor and Industry was willing to pursue
and litigate every legitimate wage claim,
such a task would be impossible. Under
the present statutory scheme, the Commissioner has the responsibility for providing
investigative and enforcement services for
the entire state. Thus, at least in theory,
this responsibility extends to thousands
upon thousands of employment relationships. Such a scheme is clearly unworkable
and, therefore, it is not surprising that the
wage collection laws of many states
expressly authorize enforcement through
private civil actions.l°
In considering whether a private cause of
action should exist under a statute, it is
helpful to focus on the underlying purpose
of the law and the policies it is intended to
serve. By this approach, it may be determined whether private enforcement
would better effectuate the purposes of the
statute, or conversely, whether it would

cause undue interference with administration of the law by the state. Because no
case law exists under the Maryland statute,
it is necessary to look to judicial interpretations of other state statutes to attempt to
ascertain the legislative purpose of the
Maryland law. I I
2. Private Enforcement v. Employer
Economic Superiority
In Ressler v. Jones Motor Co., 337 Pa.
Super. 602, 487 A.2d 424 (1985), the legislative purpose of the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law was explained in terms of both the employee rights to
be protected and the employer conduct to
be discouraged. The court held that the
central aim of the statute was to "aid an
employee in the prompt collection of compensation due him and to discourage an
employer from using a position of
economic superiority as a lever to dissuade
an employee from promptly collecting his
agreed compensation." ld. at 610, 487 A.2d
at 429, (quoting, State ex reI. Nilson v. Ore·
gon State Motor Ass'n., 248 Or. 133, 138,
432 P.2d 512, 515 (1967». Borrowing from
an interpretation of New York's wage collection law, the Ressler coun further stated
that "the purpose of statutes of this nature
is to effect a quick payment of wages of
compensation due in order to undercut
any position of economic superiority
possessed by the employer." ld. at 611, 487
A.2d at 429, (citing, Weingrad v. Fischer &
Porter Co., 47 D & C.2d 244, 251 (C.c.P.
Bucks Co. 1968).
Likewise, it may be concluded that one
of the primary goals of the Maryland act is
to "equalize" the superior economic position of employers vis-a-vis their employees. It is clearly evident that this purpose
would be better served by allowing for the
private enforcement of wage claims. By
giving employees the right to take independent legal action and recover not only
compensation due, but liquidated damages
and attorney's fees, the employee is placed
upon a more equal footing with his
employer.
If a party does not have the right to
bring a private enforcement action and is
unable to obtain the suppon of the state,
he remains essentially at the mercy of the
employer. 12 In order to effectively equalize
the economic superiority of the employer,
it is necessary for the employee to have the
right to bring a private cause of action.
Only in this way can the rights of the
employee be forcefully protected and the
intent of the statute be fully carried out.
3. Private Enforcement to Augment the
Law's Deterrent Effect
Where a wage collection statute authorizes private enforcement, such suits are
usually encouraged to a great extent by the
availability of liquidated damages or other
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the award of fees is mandatory, rather than
discretionary. Thus, because of the importance of such rights, many state legislatures
have determined that where an employee
is forced to litigate in order to recover
wages unlawfully withheld, an award of
attorney's fees is unquestionably appropriate and, therefore, is not a matter for
judicial discretion. 14
Moreover, as a general point, courts have
interpreted attorney's fees provisions in
wage collection laws as essential for protecting employee rights and deterring
employer misconduct. See e.g., Curry'll.
Sutherland, 111 W.L.R. 1613 (D.c. Super.
Ct. 1983); Garvin'll. Timber Cutters, Inc.,
61 Or. App. 497, 658 P.2d 1164 (1983). It
is clear that the right to recover attorney's
fees is a fundamental prerequisite to an
v. Indiana Spring Channel Gold Mining
effective and efficient wage collection
Co., 37 Cal. App. 370, 380, 174 P. 378
scheme.
(1918)). Similarly, the purpose of a proviF. The Case for Personal Liability of
sion in Hawaii's wage law (Haw. Rev. Stat.
Corporate Officers
§388-10 (1985) which mandates that cer1. Underlying Principles and Theories of
tain civil penalties be awarded to the
Liabilities
employee was found to have been intendThe third major significant difference
ed to "encourage employers to pay wage
between the Maryland statute and wage
promptly, reduce employee's economic
collection laws of other states is that the
losses, and strengthen the law." A rimizu v.
Maryland law does not provide for the
Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 5 Haw. App. 106,
imposition of personal liability against cor679 P.2d 627, 631 (1984).
porate officers or agents. Because the offiThese types of remedies provide a significers of a corporation are not, as a matter of
cant deterrent effect against nongeneral corporate law, usually liable for
compliance. The benefit of this approach
the debts or obligations of a corporation,
has been recognized by the Maryland legisthis issue presents perhaps the most sensilature because section 94(g)(2) of the stative and difficult question of all. The suctute allows an injured employee the right
cessful collection or enforcement of a wage
to recover up to three times the amount of
claim can often depend upon the availabilicompensation owed. Under the Maryland
ty of such liability and therefore, this issue
law, however, the right to bring a private
may also be the most important.
action to enforce a wage claim does not
Despite the well-recognized virtues and
exist. Thus, a treble damage award would
benefits of the normally all powerful coronly be available in a civil action brought
porate shield, many wage collection
by the State.
schemes allow for the imposition of indiWhile it must be conceded that the very
vidual liability against corporate officers.
existence of these types of penalty proviThe reason for this noted exception in the
sions do serve to deter unlawful conduct to
area of wage payment and collection may
some degree, the effectiveness of such a
be attributed to the fact that these statutes,
deterrent is substantially undermined
like the doctrine of limited corporate liawhen the ability to enforce the law and
bility, are also based upon important pubimpose penalties rests entirely with the
lic policy considerations. Thus, the
state. The success of any penalty, in terms
particular design of a wage collection law
of its deterrent effect, .cannot depend solewith respect to such liability provisions
ly upon its mere existence; the effecinevitably requires a delicate legislative act
tiveness of a sanction is also determined by
of balancing conflicting and competing
its availability and use. If a penalty of this
rights and needs.
sort if not readily available or is rarely
There are essentially two versions of
invoked, its credibility is significantly
provisions allowing for the personalliabiliweakened. This is especially true where, as
ty of corporate officers in the area of wage
is the case with the Maryland law, the stapayment and collection. The first involves
tute and its penalties have never been
a more demanding standard because it
which authorize private enforcement
tested or proven.
requires the plaintiff to show that the corallow for the recovery of attorney's fees in
In view of the above, it is submitted that
porate officer acted knowingly and in
addition to compensatory and punitive
wilful violation of the law. The second,
in order for the treble damages provision
damages.1J
and more liberal, version, imposes a type
of the Maryland statute to have any real
Where wage collection laws provide for
of strict liability upon corporate officials
force, private enforcement of the statute
and holds them responsible for unpaid
attorney's fees, it is usuall stipulated that
must be permitted. Greater availability of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J9.3/The Law Forum-21

similar remedies. The intended purpose of
allowing such remedies is to deter violations of the law. It is hoped that the deterrent effect will compel compliance with
the law and thereby avoid the need for the
use of any types of enforcement actions.
In discussing the legislative intent of a
provision permitting treble damages under
California's wage collection law (Cal. Lab.
Code, §206(b)(West 1971 & Supp. 1988),
the court stated that "[t]he intention of the
penalty imposed by the act in question is
to make it in the interest of the employer
to keep faith with his employees and thus
avoid injury to them and possible injury to
the public at large." Triad Data Services v.
Jackson, 153 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1,10, 200
Cal. Rptr. 418,422 (1984) (quoting Moore

this sanction would surely bolster the credibility of the law and thereby enhance its
deterrent effect. Additionally, in terms of
both safeguarding employee rights and
deterring employer misconduct, the right
to bring a private action under the statute
would make the law more effective
because it would allow for more widespread and comprehensive enforcement. In
sum, it seems clear that it would be consistent with the purposes of the Maryland
statute to allow for private enforcement
because it would unquestionably serve to
better protect employee rights and more
effectively deter unlawful conduct.
E. The Case for Awarding Attorney's
Fees
In order for a private right of action to
exist as a viable option, it is essential that
the prevailing party be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees and any incidental costs of litigation. Otherwise, injured
employees would be deterred from pursuing valid wage claims because of the often
high, and in many cases prohibitive, costs
of litigation.
Although it could be argued that civil
remedies, such as liquidated or treble
damages, would alone be sufficient to compensate injured employees, the better view
is that allowing both attorney's fees and
penalties provides for a more effective and
forceful wage collection law. Moreover,
such provisions are intended to serve different purposes. Punitive or liquidated
damages are meant to deter future violations of the law, while an award of attorney's fees is intended to reimburse an
injured employee for costs expended in litigation. /ves v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126
N.H. 796, 498 A.2d 297,303 (1985); see also
Mayday v. Elview·Stewart Sys. Co., 324
N.W. 2d 467 (Iowa, 1962). It is not surprising that most wage collection laws

"for private . .. action
to exist . .. it is
essential that the
prevailing party . ..
recover attorney's
fiees . ... "

wages regardless of fault or intent.
Although the wage collection statutes of
most states allow for personal liability to
some extent, it seems that the dominant
trend is to use the higher standard and
require conduct of an intentional or willful nature.
Regardless of the standard for such liability, the intended purpose of these types of
provisions remains the same-to ensure
that workers receive their due compensation. More specifically, it has been held
that the legislative purpose of such provisions was to make those responsible for
the expenditure of corporate funds personally liable for the payment of wages. Labor·
ers Combined Funds v. Mattei, 359 Pa.
Super. 399, 518 A.2d 1296 (1986). Moreover, liability provisions of this sort may be
viewed as creating a type of insurance to
employees, wherein "the officers of the
corporation are in effect guarantors of
[wage] payment." Sasso v. Millbrook
Enters., 108 Misc.2d 562, 438 N.Y.2d 59,
62 (1981).
2. Strict Liability for Corporate Officers
The Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Act includes a provision which
imposes a type of strict liability against
corporate officers solely because of their
position in the corporation. The basis for
imposing personal liability against corporate officers under the Pennsylvania act
lies in the statute's definition of employer
which states that an "employer" shall
include "every person, firm, partnership
association, corporation ... and any agent
or officer of any of the above-mentioned
classes employing any person in this Commonwealth." Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43, §260.2a
(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988).
In applying this section, the Pennsylvania courts have held that the statute
does not require a finding of intent, i.e.,
that the violation of the law was due to
wilful conduct. Amalgamated Cotton Gar·
ment & Allied Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa.
Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123, 124-125 (1985).
Rather, this provision has been viewed as
imposing a type of strict liability because
personal liability attaches against corporate officers immediately upon nonpayment, regardless of whether such
non-payment was an intentional or willful
violation of the law. See, Laborers Com·
bined Funds, 359 Pa. Super. at 407, 518
A.2d at 1299-1301. This liability has also
been described as a type of contract liability where the intent of a party is irrelevant
to the existence of a contractual breach. Id.
at 409 n.5, 518 A.2d at 1301 n.5.
It is clear that the Pennsylvania legislature, and other states (e.g. Vermont and
the District of Columbia) which have
taken this approach, made a deliberate
choice to provide substantial protection
for the wage rights of employees, at the

expense of a significant exception to the
doctrine of limited corporate liability.
Unquestionably, the sanction of strict liability gives the law powerful force and
effect. The benefit is that employees do
not have to demonstrate that the employer's conduct was intentional in nature,
only that wages were not paid. Additionally, the severity of this sanction is likely
to compel corporate officers to take wage
payment responsibilities seriously and
avoid violations of the law at all costs. For
these reasons, thIS version of the personal
liability of corporate officers should be
incorporated into the Maryland statute.
Because the dominant trend among most
states, however, is to opt for the more
limited version of personal liability, the
requirement of willfulness or intent should
also be examined in order that a balanced
perspective be presented.
3. Liability for Willful of Intentional
Violations
Most states which permit personalliability to be imposed against corporate officers
for wage violations require the employee
to show that the alleged conduct was of a
willful or intentional nature. For example,

"the dominant trend
.. . is ... for the more
limited version of
personal liability"
New Jersey act provides for such liability
where the employer/officer "knowingly
and willfully fails or refuses to make
[wage] payments." N.J. Stat. Ann. §2a:17090.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). Such
requirements have been interpreted to
mean conduct which is "purposeful and
knowledgeable." State v. Wein, 80 N.J.
491, 404 A.2d 302 (1979). This requirement is met when a showing is made that
"[a]n employer ... having the financial
ability to pay wages which he knows he
owes, fails to pay them." Hekker v. Sabre
Constr. Co., 265 Or. 552, 510 P.2d 347,351
(1971) (quoting State ex. rei. Nilson v. Lee,
251 Or. 284, 293, 444 P.2d 548, 553
(1968». It has also been held that such liability should not attach where the nonpayment is "based upon bona fide"
dispute as to the vafidity of a wage claim.
Id. In this context, "willful" does not
require any type of malice, but only
requires that "the thing done or omitted to
be done was done or omitted intentionally." Weinzirl v. Wells Group, Inc., 234
Kan. 1016, 677 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1984)
(quoting State ex. reL Nilson v. Johnston,
233 Or. 103, 108, 377, P.2d 331 (1962))

The essence of this standard has been
interpreted to mean that personal liability
can be imposed against corporate officers
when such individuals "knowingly permit
the corporation to violate [the law]." Ives
at 796, 498 A.2d at 303. Neither mistake or
inadvertence will suffice. Rather, an affirmative showing is required that demonstrates that the officers of the corporation,
having the ability to pay, knowingly and
intentionally refused or failed to do so. Id.
Although this version of a personal liability provision imposes a substantial burden upon the injured employee, it can still
be a fairly effective mechanism for collecting unpaid wages and deterring employer
misconduct. Moreover, because this version represents the more dominant trend,
its popularity is likely to be somewhat persuasive. Regardless of which standard is
applied, it is clear that the effective
enforcement of wage claims often depends
upon the availability of this type of
remedy. The right to impose personal liability against corporate officers in the area
of wage collection is of critical importance
because a significant number of legitimate
wage claims arise in situations where the
corporate entity is experiencing financial
difficulties. Still, corporate officers are nevertheless able to reap profits or convert
assets for their own benefit. For these
reasons it is clear that such a provision represents a key ingredient in a successful
wage collection scheme.
G. Federal Preemption Issues
A significant problem involving the use
and effectiveness of state wage collection
laws not discussed above concerns the
broad preemptive powers of federal labor
and employment law. Specifically, the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
29 U.S.c. §8141-187 (1982 & Supp. 1986)
("LMRA") and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.c.
§81001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1986)
("ERISA") provide that state law in the
areas covered by these respective statutes is
preempted.
ERISA 15 was enacted by Congress to
protect employees from "abuses in the
administration and investment of private
retirement plans and employee welfare
plans." Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d
1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). Thus, where
an employer fails to make fringe benefit
contributions pursuant to a benefit plan
covered by ERISA, employees may bring
an action under the statute and are entitled
to the rights and remedies provided therein. 16 In addition, state law may provide
remedies in such cases in that many state
wage collection acts also extend to fringe
benefit contributions. 17
With respect to benefit contributions
covered by ERISA, reliance on state law is
expressly foreclosed. The relevant preemption clause, 29 U.S.c. §1144{a), states that
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the provisions of the statute "shall super·

sede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan" covered by the Act. (emphasis added). Accordingly, where state collection laws have been relied upon to recover
benefit contributions, such claims will be
preempted where federal law (of which
ERISA is a part) is shown to be applicable.

See e.g. Nat'l Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986).
The Labor Management Relations Act
has also been found to have a preemptive
effect upon state law. Preemption in this
context, has been the result of judicial
interpretation, rather than express legislative mandate. Section 301 of the LMRA,
29 U.S:c. §185, gives the parties to collective bargaining agreements the right to sue
in federal court to enforce the terms of
such contracts. 18 The federal remedy created by Section ,301 is exclusive. 19 Thus,
actions to enforce collective bargaining
agreements must be based on federal law,
not state law. Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).20 Accordingly, where an employer fails to pay
wages due under a collective bargaining
agreement, a right exists to seek payment
through a Section 301 enforcement action,
and remedies provided by state wage collection laws are foreclosed. 21
It seems clear that an action brought
under a state wage collection law for failure to make wage payments or fringe benefits contributions may be effectively
precluded by an argument based on federal
preemption. While it is fair to say that the
majority view favors preemption, some
courts have nevertheless held that the
scope and reach of the federal law is not so
pervasive as to preclude all state actions.
According to this view, it is possible for a
state wage collection mechanism to coexist with the federal remedies created by
ERISA and the LMRA without undue
interference with exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus, the effect of federal preemption in this area is not entirely clear and
some dissension exists among authorities
who have addressed the issue.
With respect to the minority view, most
of the cases have confronted issues involving the effect of ERISA rather than the
LMRA. These decisions hold that ERISA
does not necessarily always preempt state
wage and benefit claims and that, despite
the existence of federal preemption in this
area, it is possible for federal and state
remedies to co-exist. The basis for such
holdings is an exception to ERISA's
preemption clause, which provides that
the preemption clause "shall not apply to

any generally applicable criminal law of a
state." 29 U.S.c. §1144(b)(4) (emphasis
added).
Whether the exception provided by

§1144(b)(4) can be relied upon in order to
uphold a state action for criminal penalties
ultimately depends on how a court interprets the meaning of the phrase "any generally applicable criminal law." Most
courts which have addressed the issue have
found that wage and/or benefit collection
laws, such as the type which exist in
Maryland, are not "generally applicable
criminal laws," because such statutes pertain only to wages and benefits. It is reasoned, therefore, that they cannot be the
type which Congress intended to include
within the exemption. Accordingly, under
the majority view, such laws are preempted by ERISA, notwithstanding the fact
that they provide for criminal sanctions.22

"state collection
laws . .. will be
preempted where
federal law is
.. . applicable. "
A minority view exists which holds that
ERISA does not preempt state wage and
benefit statutes when such laws give rise to
criminal penalties. According to this view,
any state law which sanctions criminal
prosecution is a "generally applicable
criminal law" under §1144(b X4) of ERISA
and consequently is not preempted. Such
holdings persist, despite the fact that the
state laws are specifically designed to cover
only the nonpayment of wages and benefits. See Upholsterers Intern. Union v. Pon·
tiac Furniture, 647 F.supp 1053 (C.O. Ill.
1986); Sasso v. Vochris, 116 Misc.2d 797,
456 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1982).
Another view attempts to strike somewhat of a middle ground on the issue. In
Nat'l Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d at
828-29 (7th Cir. 1986), the court noted in
dicta that while ERISA and the LMRA
would usually preclude enforcement of
state wage payment acts when collective
bargaining agreements are involved,
preemption may not exist where nonpayment "is in such patent bad faith as to partake of the wrongfulness associated with
some of the traditional common law intentional torts .... " The suggestion seems to
be that such circumstances might put the
wrongful act outside the scope of federal
labor law. This logic has a certain appeal,
and given the appropriate facts, it could
conceivably be sufficient to persuade a
court from foreclosing a state action on
preemption grounds.
In sum, while authority exists to support

both viewpoints, the majority position is
likely to continue to dominate. Due to the
broad preemptive force of federal law in
this area, state wage collection actions are
likely to be preempted where ERISA or
the LMRA is found to apply. Regardless of
the final outcome of the preemption issue,
however, state wage collection laws will
continue to playa vital and significant role
in those areas of labor relations when federal law is not applicable. Where benefits
owed to an employee are not covered by
ERISA, or wages due are not pursuant to
a collective bargain~ng agreement governed by the LMRA, state wage collection
actions will continue to provide effective
remedies. Indeed, for such employees, state
wage laws may provide the only available
relief.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing analysis and
arguments it is submitted that the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection
should be revised to incorporate the
amendments proposed herein. Such revision would unquestionably enhance the
effectiveness of the law and serve to protect and promote .the rights and policies
embodied in the Act.
FOOTNOTES
IWhile Subsection (b) appears to emphasize the requirement of timeliness, it seems
obvious from the entire text of the statute
that the Act attempts to prohibit the more
serious harm of non·payment, rather than
just late payments.
2In order for treble damages to be appropriate under the law, the "non-payment"
cannot be the "result of a bona fide dispute." §94(g)(2).
JIn full §94(F)(1) states: "Any employer
who wilfully violates the provisions of this
subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof, may be fined an
. amount not to exceed $1,000."
4It is not suggested that the successful resolution of wage claims by the Commissioner should be slighted, but only that a 100
percent success rate is a virtual impossibility. Consequently, the dearth of case law
must be attributable to other reasons.
5The most serious types of claims which
typically arise under wage collection laws
usually involve disputes over the non·
payment of wages, as opposed to untimely
payment, unauthorized deductions, irregular pay periods, etc. Moreover, claims for
non-payment often occur in situations
where the employer is experiencing some
type of financial difficulty, e.g. bankruptcy, insolvency, business closing, etc.
Under such circumstances, an employee
who is owed several paychecks can indeed
be left in dire straits and may be critically
dependent upon an effective wage collection law.
6Case law arising under state wage collec-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 9 . 3 I T h e Law Forum-23

tion laws can be easily located within the
annotations to these statutes or by
researching a law under the appropriate
state or regional digest. Additionally, these
statutes have given rise to a multitude of
lawsuits and judicial opinions. See e.g., The
California's Wage Collection Statute, Cal.
Lab. Code §200-270 (West 1971 & Supp.
1988); Illinois Wage Payment & Collection Act, Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 48, para. 39
1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1986); and Pennsylvania
Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa.
Stat. Ann., tit. 43, §260.1-110 (Purdon
1964 & Supp. 1988). Further discussion of
such laws and specific cases arising under
them is provided below.
7See also Ward v. Whalen, 18 Pa. D&C.3d
710 (1981) (corporate officer constitutes
employer under the act and therefore is
personally liable); In Re Johnston, 24
Bankr. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (corporate
officer personally liable for financial obligations of corporation).
8Examples of cases involving each of the
statutory provisions in question are provided below.
9While it is recommended here that the
Maryland statute be amended to expressly
allow for private enforcement, it is clearly
conceivable that an implied right of action
could be argued to exist under the law. See
e.g., Vassallo v. Haber Elec. Co." 435 A.2d
1046 (Del. Super. 1981) (private cause of
action exists under Delaware's wage collection law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 29 §912(1983
& Supp. 1988). Notwithstanding this possibility, it would nevertheless be more
appropriate for the General Assembly to
amend the Maryland statute to expressly
authorize private enforcement. The chief
benefit of this strategy is that a clear and
unambiguous message would be sent to
employers and employees alike.
lO'fhe right to bring a private suit on such
claims despite the state's refusal to pursue
the matter may be important for a number
of reasons. For example, the strength of a
particular claim could be fatally underestimated by the Commissioner. Additionally, civil discovery may allow an
employee to obtain the documentation
necessary to substantiate his claim.
- IIBecause all wage collection laws seek to
achieve basically the same objective, i.e.
the prompt and certain payment of wages,
case law from other jurisdictions regarding
the legislative intent of such statutes provides strongly persuasive authority.
Indeed, as will be shown, it is not uncommon for courts of one state to look to the
decisions of another state in this context.
I2While an injured employee would always
have the right to sue in contract, in many
instances such an action would not be pursued due to the often prohibitive costs of

litigation. Indeed, in many wage cases, it
would not be worthwhile for an employee
to incur the costs of a lawsuit, unless attorney's fees and/or some type of liquidated
damages were available.
USee e.g., the wage collection laws referred
to above for the states of Pennsylvania, the
District of Columbia, California, New
Hampshire, Iowa and Hawaii.
"See e.g., the wage collection statutes for
California Cal.L~b. Code, §98.2(bXWest
1971 & Supp. 198-8); District of Columbia,
D.C. Code Ann. §36-108(b)(1988), and
Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43,
§260.9a(f)(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988);
where the operative language in such provisions states that the court shall award
attorney's fees, rather than may award
such fees.
15ERISA applies to employee benefit plans
(pension and welfare) which are established and maintained:
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce;
(2) by any employee organization or
organization representing employees
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce or
both.
16See 29 U.S.c. §§1131-1145.
17See e.g. Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94(a)(3)
(1983).
'8Section 301, 29 U.S.c. §185(a) provides:
"Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this [Act] ...
may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the
parties ...."
19Nat'L Itfetalcra/ters 784 F.2d at 823.

2°SeealsoAllis·Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 220 (1985) ("when resolution of
state law claim is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of [a collective
bargaining agreement], that claim must
either be treated as a §301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract laws").
21See e.g. Nat'l Metalcra/ters, 784 F.2d at
823.
22See Sforza v. Kenco Constr. Inc., 7 E.B.C.
1181 (D. Conn. 1986); Sheet Metal Workers
v. Aberdeen BSM Wkrs., 559 F.Supp. 561
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560
F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Com·
monwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485, 419
N.E.2d 1374 (1981). See also National Car·
riers Con! Comm. v. Hefferman, 454
F.Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
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